to regard analysis as the living core of Greek mathematical thought, what the geometers did by themselves and taught to their students, while most of the works they publish and make available to people outside the school are only the dead husks. If analysis is such a powerful source of insight in mathematics, it is natural for the philosophers to hope to find something like it in philosophy.
At least from the second century AD on, the philosophers were interested in taking geometrical analysis as a model for philosophy: the hope was that the proved success of the method in mathematics would rub off on the philosophers, or, more cynically, that the prestige of the method in mathematics would help to justify what the philosophers were already doing.6 What I am interested in is whether Plato, in the fourth century BC, was already taking this kind of interest in the method of analysis. Proclus likes to think of Plato the philosopher as giving directions to the mathematicians about what problems to work on, and even as teaching them mathematical methods, but it is more fruitful to ask what philosophical inspiration Plato may have taken from the mathematicians: for it is certainly clear that Plato was an enthusiast for mathematical training and that he "everywhere tries to arouse admiration for mathematics among students of philosophy" (Proclus In Euclidem p. 66).7 Plato and his contemporaries do not use "analysis," as the neo-Platonists will, as a general term for all reasoning to first principles in philosophy as well as mathematics. Indeed, Plato never uses the word "analysis" (or the verb &vakX_tv) at all. But that does not show that Plato and others in the Academy may not have thought about or alluded to geometrical analysis, or taken it as a model in their own reasoning. I will argue that Plato does, at least once, allude to geometrical analysis, and that he at least experimented with taking it as a model for philosophical reasoning.
First I should say what the method of analysis was. It is standard to start by commenting on the late ancient definitions or descriptions of analysis, since we have nothing like a definition of analysis before about the first century AD (probably the earliest are Heron and Alcinous; the only extended description is in Pappus, probably third century).8 Unfortunately, these descriptions of analysis are unclear and sometimes 6 This history will be traced in Don Morrison's work-in-progress cited above. 7 For a sceptical treatment of the image of Plato as "research director" of mathematics in the Academy, see now Leonid Zhmud, "Plato as 'Architect of Science,"' in Phronesis, v. 43 (1998), pp. 211-44. K The Heron text, short and probably not improved in translation, is cited by Nairizi misleading at crucial points, so they need a fair amount of commentary. Fortunately, we are not dependent on these "official" descriptions, and (despite the impression one might get from the scholarly literature) there is no real doubt about what analysis was -there are the extant texts of Archimedes, Apollonius and Pappus practicing analysis, and this is not a lost art, but something one can easily train oneself to do on the ancient model; and once we master the practice, we can understand the official if it is agreed to be true, what was sought will also be true, and its proof is the reverse of the analysis; but if we encounter something agreed to befalse, then what was sought will also be false. In the problematic kind, we assume the thing prescribed as if known, and then, proceed through what follows as true, to something that is [already] agreed: if it is agreed to be possible and furnishable (what the mathematicians call 'given'), the thing prescribed will also be possible, and again the proof will be the reverse of the analysis; but if we encounter something agreed to be impossible, the problem too will be impossible. Atoptag6o is adding a condition [reading npoa5txaroX'i for npo8taatoXi] on when, how, and in how many ways the problem will be possible. So much, then, on analysis and synthesis." (Pappus, Collection VII,1-2, Jones' translation modified).
descriptions, while recognizing their imprecisions.' While analysis is not terribly mysterious, it is difficult to give a precise logical account of it; and given the general failure of the Greeks at describing the logical structure of mathematical reasoning, it is not surprising that their descriptions of the logic of analysis can be improved on. A basically correct logical description has been given by Hintikka and Remes (along with, unfortunately, much that is incorrect), and I will make use of their work, as well as of the extant ancient examples and descriptions of analysis. The most common account of analysis, both in the ancient sources and in modern reconstructions, goes something like this. We are trying to prove a proposition P, the Clqtoiu'evov or thing-sought. As a heuristic toward finding a proof, we assume the 4iyrol4tevov P as if it were known to be true, and then draw inferences from this assumption; the analysis terminates -and something "clicks" -when we derive either a proposition known to be true (from the principles of geometry and from theorems we have already proved), or else a proposition known to be false. If we can infer from P to a proposition known to be false, then we have proved 1 P by reductio ad absurdum. If we have inferred from P to a proposition R that we know to be true, then we can try to reverse each step of the derivation of R from P: if this succeeds, then the proof of R, together with the derivation of P from R, give us a proof of P. Of course, there is no guarantee that the analysis (i.e. the derivation of R from P) is reversible: but it does very frequently happen that steps of geometrical arguments are reversible (i.e. that if a step P-+Q is legitimate, so is Q-+P; e.g. "if triangle ABC is isosceles, it has equal base angles", and also "if triangle ABC has equal base angles, it is isosceles"), and in carrying out the analysis intelligently we will try to avoid obviously non-reversible steps (e.g. "if triangle ABC is isosceles, its angles are equal to two right angles"). So although an analysis leading to a positive result does not guarantee that the 4Toi4tEVOV can be proved, it may still be heuristically useful, since it constructs a plausible outline for a proof, and we can then try to fill in the steps. Some ancient (and modem) writers, bothered by the logical gap between a successful analysis of P and a successful proof of P, say instead that analysis begins from the 4iyrou'4evov P and proceeds (not to propositions that follow from P but) to "propositions from which the iiTo'gevov 9 Nineteenth-century geometry texts often gave instructions for how to carry out analyses and syntheses -these instructions are logically inexact, but show that the authors, and the teachers and students who used their books, did habitually carry out the practice of analysis. would follow," so that as soon as we reach a proposition known to be true, we would have a guaranteed proof of P. But it is historically clear that analysis was always a deductive procedure starting with the 4itouie-vov, and this is also much more practicable and heuristically useful. The only legitimate sense in which in analysis we are looking for "propositions from which the 4To{jievov would follow" rather than "propositions which follow from the 4TfloU{gevov" is that we are looking for propositions which, in the completed demonstration, will be prior to P, and so which, in some vague "causal" sense, may be seen as "naturally" prior to P.
However, as Hintikka and Remes recognized, this standard account of analysis is logically very imprecise, and its imprecisions make it hard to see why analysis would be heuristically valuable. While analysis looks for a proof of a proposition by assuming the 4Tyou'evov as if it were known and drawing inferences from it, it is a serious mistake to identify the tol4icEVOV with the proposition we are trying to prove. To begin with, Greek mathematical texts contain two kinds of propositions, theorems and problems, and analysis may be seeking a proof of either. Only theorems are what we would call propositions: a theorem is a statement asserting that all figures of a given class have some particular property, while a problem is a challenge to construct a figure having certain prescribed properties (and/or certain prescribed relations to a given figure). While the enunciation of a theorem is a complete sentence, the enunciation of a problem is an infinitive phrase (e.g. "to inscribe in a given circle a triangle similar to a given triangle" or "to construct an equilateral and equiangular pentagon"). Pappus distinguishes accordingly between "theoretic" analysis (analysis of theorems) and "problematic" analysis (analysis of problems). In problematic analysis the 7n?ob'gevov is not a proposition at all, but rather an object, the figure we are trying to construct: we assume the desired figure as if its size, shape and position were known, and make constructions out of it (and draw inferences about the figures we construct, from the assumption that the 4nto{vtevov had the prescribed properties), until "something clicks" and we construct a figure whose size, shape and position we recognize that we can determine from the givens of the problem alone (together with the principles of geometry and with propositions we have already proved), independently of our assumption about the When I say "Vx", this means a block of universal quantifiers, possibly more than one (but it is important that there are no existential quantifiers in Greek theorems); similarly, "Px" may really be a relational expression "Pxyz".
" The argument will depend on a natural-deduction step, but so do all proofs in Greek geometry, since they all work by proving the instance of the proposition set out in the c0e'At; and toptag'S;, and then inferring to the universal proposition. the analysis starts by assuming both ends together, and this additional logical power helps to explain why we are likely to be able to infer something that we can recognize as true (or as false): whereas, if we were simply arguing "backwards" from Qx to Px, it is hard to see why this should be heuristically any more useful than arguing "forwards."'2
We can try to give a similar logical description of problems and of problematic analysis. This should come with a warning label, since, in the case of problems more clearly than in the case of theorems, we are in conflict with the Greek conception of these propositions when we represent them in the notation of the predicate calculus. To every Greek problem there is a corresponding proposition with the logical form Vx (Px-+3y Qxy) [or in prenex normal form Vx3y (Px-+Qxy)] -so the problem "to inscribe in a given circle a triangle similar to a given triangle" can be rewritten as "for any circle x and any triangle x', there is a triangle y such that y is inscribed in x and y is similar to x"'. Any demonstration of the problem also demonstrates this universal-existential proposition; but the only acceptable demonstrations of the problem are constructive demonstrations, that is, procedures that show how to construct the Ctycol,uevov y from any given x such that Px, accompanied by a proof that Qxy.'3 Greek theorems, as opposed to problems, never involve existential quantifiers; universal-existential propositions appear in Greek mathematics only in the guise of problems.'4 I am not saying that Greek geometers identified the called "porisms" rather than "problems," which are phrased as a challenge, not to construct something, but to find something (because it is a point or an abstract magnitude or number, none of which are properly "constructed," or because it has already implicitly been constructed in the ?W6eat; or in the demonstration of a previous proposition). But these, like problems, are infinitive phrases rather than what we would call propositions. There are also some propositions in Euclid's arithmetical books (the group beginning VIII,8, on how many numbers "fall" in continued proportion between two given numbers, and IX,20, "prime numbers are more than any assigned multitude of prime numbers"), as well as X,1 ("two unequal magnitudes being set out, if from the greater there be subtracted a magnitude greater than its half, and from that which is left a magnitude greater than its half, and if this process be repeated continually, there will be left some magnitude which will be less than the lesser magnitude set out"), which are phrased as theorems but might be stated in modern terms as universal-existential propositions, with the existential quantifier ranging over finite sequences of arbitrary length. But Euclid certainly does not understand the propositions in this way, and problem with the universal-existential proposition, but insisted that such propositions could only be proved constructively; nor am I saying that they distinguished the problem from the universal-existential proposition, and said that a narrower range of demonstrations would be acceptable for the problem than for the theoretical proposition. The truth is that neither Greek mathematicians nor Greek philosophers had a conception of a universal-existential proposition at all, and that Greek geometers phrased so many of their propositions as problems, as challenges to do or construct something, partly as an attempt to compensate for the lack of a logic that could handle multiply quantified propositions.
With these caveats, we can try to give a logical description of problematic analysis. In the problem Vx (Px-+]y Qxy), on the Greek understanding, the 41iTo0visEvov is not a proposition but an object y such that Qxy. In analysis, we assume a given x such that Px, and we also assume the illToievov y such that Qxy. We then make constructions and inferences from x and y, using the given Px and the assumption Qxy. Eventually we construct an object z having some particular relation to x, such that we can determine z merely from knowing what x is and from knowing that Px, without relying on y or on the assumption Qxy. Using "4p" etc. as symbols for construction-procedures, this happens if from PxrQxy we can derive Rxq(x, y), and if from PxnRxz we can derive z = y(x). If this succeeds, we try to reverse the analysis, first by proving that Px implies RxNI(x), and then by reversing the construction of z = (p(x, y) to give a construction y = x(x, z), and proving that Pxr)Rxz imply QxX(x, z). If this can be done, then setting y = x(x, Ny(x)) gives us a constructionprocedure and a proof for Vx (Px-+3y Qxy).S Or, with problematic as with indeed the awkwardness of these propositions reflects his lack of the concept of a sequence as the kind of object that can be quantified over. This kind of difficulty seems not to arise in the geometrical books.
Is It is worth stressing that there is a close formal parallelism between problematic and theoretic analysis, since this may be disguised by the symbolism I have used, which is considerably more complicated for problematic than for theoretic analysis. But we could instead describe problematic analysis by mimicking the simpler description of theoretic analysis, by saying "assume the tnirobUgvov 3y Qxy as well as the given Px, then infer a proposition 3z Rxz which we know to be true (or false) on the basis of the given Px, then (if the result was positive) try to reverse by showing that 3z Rxz implies the 4qtoi'*evov 3y Qxy". Here, by treating 3y Qxy as if it were a monadic predicate of x, we are putting the problematic analysis into the form of a theoretic analysis. And this is in fact a logically correct description of problematic analysis, as long as we require proofs of existential propositions to be constructive: thus proving theoretic analysis, we might reach a negative result, discovering that the assumption Qxy contradicts the given Px: this would happen if (as before) we construct some (p(x, y) satisfying a relation Rx(p(x, y), and then, instead of (as in the positive case) recognizing that [PxrRxz],[Pxn(z = (x))], we recognize that PxrRxz imply a contradiction, and that the problem is therefore unsolvable. But more often than reaching a purely negative result, we will discover that the problem is solvable only under some conditions: this will happen when we recognize that PxrRxz imply some further condition Sx; we can then try to reverse the analysis by showing that, under the hypothesis Sx, z is given by some construction xV(x), and that PxrSx imply RxNI(x), and so on, using z = V(x) to construct y and to deduce Qxy. In this case analysis will have revealed the StoptaRgo, the necessary and sufficient conditions for the problem to be solvable, and this was indeed one major use of problematic analysis in Greek geometry. It may also happen that we do not know how to lead the analysis to either a positive or a negative result, but that we can reduce the problem "given x such that Px, to construct y such that Qxy" to an easier or more fundamental problem, "given x such that Px, to construct z such that Rxz": this will happen if, as before, we find a construction-procedure (p(x, y) and prove that PxriQxy imply Rx(p(x, y), and if we can then reverse this analysis by finding a construction-procedure x(x, z) and proving that PxnRxz imply Qxx(x, z). Once again, this was a major use of problematic analysis: indeed, it seems reasonable to describe Hippocrates of Chios' reduction of the problem of doubling the cube to the problem of finding two mean proportionals as an early application of problematic analysis.
Problematic and theoretic analysis are formally similar enough that (in both ancient and modem accounts) they are often covered by the same general description: these descriptions tend to apply more immediately to Aied retic analysis, which is logically simpler, leaving problematic analysis is an awkward complication. Nonetheless, it is clear both that problematic analysis is historically older, and that it was heuristically more fruitful. That problematic analysis is older is natural enough, since it is an older and more basic task of geometry to construct or find objects satisfying given descriptions (and the most basic task, that of measuring e.g. an area, was construed as the problem "to construct a square equal to a given area"), while clear standards of proof and justification develop only over time. And while theoretical analysis is essentially a method for discovering a proof of a given proposition, problematic analysis is originally a method for discovering a construction-procedure, although it can also help us discover a proof that this procedure does what it is supposed to. This also helps to explain why problematic analysis was heuristically more important: to apply theoretical analysis to a proposition P, we must already have come to suspect somehow that the proposition is true (one common use would be in teaching, where the student believes P because the teacher [or a book] says so, and then tries to find the proof for himself using analysis).'6 In problematic analysis, on the other hand, while we must suspect that the problem has some solution (and often it is intuitively obvious [e.g. by a vriat;] that it does, at least subject to some btoptapo6;), we may have no clue at all about what the solution will be. If we are trying to prove (and prove constructively) a proposition Vx (Px-ey Qxy), problematic analysis can suggest a function (p and suggest that we try proving Vx (Px-+Qxp(x)), and this is likely to get us over the biggest hurdle towards finding the proof; and in this way problematic analysis may lead us to theorems as well as to solutions of problems. All these reasons help to explain why, in the Greek texts, we find mostly descriptions of what seems to be theoretical analysis, but mostly examples of problematic analysis.
II

Given this description of geometrical analysis, as it was practiced in
Plato's time and after, we are in a position to ask: does Plato refer to the method of analysis, and does he (like late ancient Platonists and Peripatetics) take it as a model for philosophical reasoning toward first principles?
As I have already said, Plato never uses the word "analysis"; but this is compatible with his being aware of analysis as a distinctive geometrical practice, and with his alluding to this practice without using the name "analysis." In fact it is tolerably certain, not only that Plato was aware of analysis as a distinctive geometrical practice, but also that he knew it under the name "analysis," and that he was familiar with roughly the same (inadequate) logical description of analysis that we find in later writers such as Alcinous and Pappus. The reason I think Plato must have known the name "analysis," and the ancient logical description of analysis, is that we find the name and the description in three passages of Aristotle (two of them plausibly written in Plato's lifetime). Aristotle had no special expertise in mathematics going beyond his Academic colleagues, and the texts show that he is referring to a method that he expects his students, not merely to have heard of, but to be accustomed to practice themselves (the texts are in fact unintelligible except to someone who already knows what analysis is, and have often been misunderstood by both ancient and modem readers). Aristotle is reflecting mathematical knowledge that was current in the Academy, and using it to make his own philosophical points; and the same mathematical knowledge 17 I am translating ov throughout as "true", which is the easiest way to take the passage (but NB "true" in the first sentence is the unambiguous aikXiOk); if this is right, Aristotle is talking about theoretical analysis. But it is just possible that "A is ov means "A exists"; e.g., if "A" stands for "equilateral and equiangular pentagon," then "A is ov" means "there is an equilateral and equiangular pentagon," in which case Aristotle is giving a -rather less logically precise -description of problematic analysis. Nothing much hangs on this; either (as I will assume) Aristotle is talking about theoretical analysis, or he is assimilating problematic and theoretical analysis so closely that it is impossible to tell them apart.
definitions." The passage is very condensed, but Aristotle's basic point is clear enough.'8 Aristotle has been saying that there are valid arguments with (some or all) false premisses but true conclusions. He then illustrates this with an appeal to his readers' (or hearers') experience: life would be much easier in geometry if this were not the case, i.e. if every valid argument to a true conclusion also had (all) true premisses, since then an analysis could always be converted into a synthetic demonstration. I am trying to demonstrate a 4ntouigivov A;'9 so, for purposes of analysis, I assume A as if it were known to be true, and deduce B, which I in fact know to be true; so the analysis terminates. If every valid argument to a true conclusion had all its premisses true, then, since there is a valid argument from A to B, and since B is true, necessarily A would also be true; so we could automatically convert the argument from A to B into a valid argument from B to A; and since we know that B is true, this would give a demonstration of A. In fact, since some arguments do lead from false premisses to true conclusions, not all analyses convert; but Aristotle adds that, as a matter of mathematical experience, analyses often do convert. I am not sure exactly what to make of Aristotle's explanation, namely that mathematical inferences take definitions rather than accidental properties as their premisses; but one illustration would be that, if an inference (say, that a certain equality holds) depends on the premiss that a certain angle is right, it will use the full strength of the premiss that the angle is right, and not merely that it is (say) greater than 80 degrees; so it is likely to be possible to reverse the inference, to infer that if the equality holds the angle is right, since if the angle was slightly more or less than a right angle, one quantity would be slightly too large or too small. Something 18 Themistius misunderstands the passage in his paraphrase (Analyticorum posteriorum paraphrasis 26,22-8), apparently due to his ignorance of geometrical practice. Aristotle means: "Suppose we are trying, by the method of analysis, to find a proof that A. We infer from A to B, which we recognize to be true. But this does not yet show us that A is true, because a false premiss could yield a true conclusion." Themistius takes Aristotle to mean: "Suppose we are trying to find a proof that A. We realize that B implies A. But that doesn't yet show that A, because B might be false." The Aristotle text is (like the whole Posterior Analytics) highly elliptical, and Themistius fills in the ellipses incorrectly, apparently because he is unfamiliar with the practice of analysis and does not realize that the analyst takes the 4toUicvov (here A) as a premiss in the analytical stage of his argument. Themistius is apparently assuming that analysis must be something like rhetorical inventio, a practice with which he is much more familiar.
'9 Assuming that A is a proposition rather than an object. We could rewrite all this in the case where A is an object. like this is why theorems like the Pythagorean theorem tend to have true converses, although of course this does not hold in every case.20
This passage from the Posterior Analytics is enough to show that Aristotle, like later Greek writers, conceives of analysis as a process in which a tqxoiLuevov is assumed to be true, and deductions are made from it until we deduce something independently known to be true; we then try to con- Aristotle's description is inadequate in some of the same ways that other descriptions of analysis, ancient and modem, typically are. He does not distinguish the 4qo'uiiFvov from the proposition to be demonstrated. Connected with this, he treats the argument that might or might not convert as simply an inference from one proposition to another, when it is actually embedded in a natural deduction context (i.e. we are arguing from Px to Qx, neither of which is properly speaking a proposition, since they each contain a free variable). Aristotle also speaks as if there were a single premiss A and a single conclusion B, when it would be more accurate to say that we can deduce B from the premiss A and auxiliary premisses C,, C2, etc.; the argument is very unlikely to be "convertible" to an argument from B to the conjunction of the premisses Ar-C1qC2, but it might be convertible to an argument from the conjunction BqCrlC2 to A. and synthesis in geometry and procedures of non-mathematical reasoning, although it is not clear that he is willing to use the word avaXiTetv in nonmathematical cases. However, in a third passage, Aristotle does use "analysis" metaphorically to describe, not philosophical inferences, but practical reasoning from ends to means.
Having posited the end, they examine how and by what means it will come about: and if it seems that it can come about in many ways, they also examine which is the easiest and best, but if it is accomplished [only] in one way, they examine how it will come about through this means and how this means itself will come about, until they come to the first cause, which is last in discovery. For the person who deliberates seems to be inquiring and analyzing [4InrEiV K0 avaXi)elv] in the way that has been described, as if [he were inquiring into and analyzing] a 8taypagiga (it seems that not all inquiry [i]t71yt;] is deliberation -mathematical ones are not -but all deliberation is investigation); and the last thing in the analysis is the first in the coming-to-be. And if they encounter something impossible, they desist, for instance if money is needed and there is no way to provide this; but if it seems possible, they try to do it. (NE 11,3 1112bl5-27) This passage is difficult, but it is clear that Aristotle is thinking specifically of problematic analysis, and using it as a model to describe practical reasoning: we begin with a specification of the object we are trying to produce, and, positing a situation in which this has been achieved, we reason back to the way it might have been produced, until we reach something that is immediately in our power to produce. This last thing corresponds, in a problematic analysis, to the last thing we construct from the 4TnOiO.gvov, which we recognize as something that is determined by the data of the problem, so that we are able to construct it directly from the data: so this "last thing in the analysis" is the "first in the comingto-be" of the 4tovi'Pjevov; then, in reversing the analysis, we construct each of the subsequent things out of this first thing, in the reverse of the order in which we found them in the analysis, until we have constructed the 4iyoiu'gvov. The analysis has succeeded only when we have inferred from the ntrovIrvov back to a "first cause" or &pxil, meaning not a proposition we know to be true, but an object we know we can construct; whereas, if we infer to an object related to the givens of the problem in an impossible way, we have a reductio ad absurdum, and we give up the problem as unsolvable in the given case.2' 21 Aristotle may well also be thinking of analysis at NE VI,8 1142a23-30, where (ppovmlat; (the ability to deliberate well), which perceives some E,aXaxrov that is npa-T v, is compared to an ability to perceive that ro Ev Toi; gaEPhlTtKOIK; i?xaTov is (for instance) a triangle. To ev Toig actrucoi; ''aGrTov might mean simply a These passages from Aristotle show that it was possible to presuppose a familiarity with the practice of geometric analysis in Academic circles (in Plato's lifetime and in the subsequent decades); that the practice was known by the name "analysis," and that essentially the same (inadequate) logical description of analysis that we find in Pappus was already available; and, finally, that Academic philosophers were interested in using geometrical analysis, so described, as a model for philosophical (and practical) reasoning. So, even though Plato never uses the word "analysis," he and his students in the Academy were familiar with the practice; Plato could (if he wanted) allude to this geometric practice (expecting his Academic readers to fill in the name "analysis" and the logical description), and make whatever point he might want to make about the relation between this kind of mathematical reasoning and reasoning in philosophy. I will now argue that Plato does, once, so allude to analysis, in the second geometrical passage of the Meno (86e4-87b2); and then I will offer some speculations about what philosophical point Plato wanted to make by the analogy with geometry.
Socrates has proposed to examine "from a hypothesis" Meno's question whether virtue is teachable. He then says, I mean "from a hypothesis" in this way, the way the geometers often examine, when someone asks them, for example, about an area, whether it is possible to inscribe this area in this circle as a triangle. [A geometer] might say, "I don't yet know whether this [area] is such [as to make the construction possible], but I think I have as it were a hypothesis that would help towards the question, as follows: if this area is such that when it is applied to the given line [sc. the diameter of the circle], it falls short by an area similar to the applied area, then one thing seems to me to follow, but another if it is impossible for this to happen.
So after hypothesizing I am willing to tell you what follows about inscribing [the area] in the circle, whether it is impossible or not."
Here Plato is considering a geometrical problem, "to inscribe in a given circle a triangle equal to a given area"; in fact the hypothesis he gives is designed to solve the more specific problem "to inscribe in a given circle an isosceles triangle equal to a given area."22 The hypothesis that Plato mathematical particular, though it seems odd to posit a special quasi-sensory ability to recognize (individual, but perfect and hence non-sensible) mathematical triangles; but it seems more likely that to ?v toi; iahgartncoi; EGxa'rov is the last thing constructed in an analysis, which we quasi-perceptually recognize as something we already know how to construct from the givens. 22 The special problem is equivalent to the general problem in the loose sense that whenever there is a solution to the general problem there is also a solution to the CDBE, is also half of the triangle CGB. So CGB is equal to CDBE, which is equal to the given area X. So CGB is an isosceles triangle inscribed in the given circle Y and equal to the given area X: which is what was to be found.
Plato explicitly cites this example, not as an example of analysis, but only as an example of how a geometer might reason from a hypothesis in answering a given question. The question he cites proposes a problem rather than a theorem, and a full answer would be a solution to the problem: that is, the aim is not simply to answer the question "is it possible to inscribe this area in this circle as a triangle?" with yes or no, but rather, in the case where the answer is yes, to give a construction-procedure showing how to inscribe the area in the circle in the form of an [isosceles] triangle.24 When the geometer answers the question "from a hypothesis," he is taking a step toward answering the question fully, that is, toward giving both a &toptogot6 for the problem and a construction-procedure for solving it where it can be solved. So when the geometer offers to answer the question from the hypothesis "the given area can be applied to the diameter in such a way that it falls short by a figure similar to the applied area," he is not simply claiming that the original problem is solvable if and only if the application-of-areas problem is solvable, but also offering a construction-procedure to convert any solution of the application-of-areas problem into a solution to the original problem. The solution "from a hypothesis" thus reduces the original problem to the applicationof-areas problem: the task that remains is to give a Btoptagji; determining whether the application-of-areas problem can be solved for the given area and the given line, and to give a construction-procedure for solving it where it can be solved. When Plato recommends the geometers' practice of answering "from a hypothesis," he is recommending tackling a difficult question by reducing it step-by-step to more basic questions until we can answer it directly: and this is the lesson Socrates draws when, in answering Meno's question "is virtue teachable?" from the hypothesis "virtue is knowledge," he reduces Meno's question to the question "is virtue knowledge?" (87b2-dl), then answers this question in turn from the hypothesis "virtue is good" (87d2-89a7; explicitly called a "hypothesis" at 87d3), which presumably we can immediately grasp to be true. So Plato is recommending, not simply that we learn how to answer a given question X from a given hypothesis Y, but also that we learn how to tackle a given question X by finding an appropriate "hypothesis" to reduce it to.25 In giving the geometrical example, Plato leaves it mysterious how the geometer finds the appropriate hypothesis: on a superficial reading, it looks as if the geometer is simply guessing, or intuitively divining that the hypothesis "the given area can be applied to the diameter in such a way that it falls short by a figure similar to the applied area," would be useful for investigating the problem at hand; it would then be just a lucky coincidence, or a confirmation of the geometer's power of intuition, that the hypothesis turns out to be necessary and sufficient for solving the problem. But in fact this hypothesis was certainly found by the method of analysis, and is very typical of the use of analysis in reducing a problem to an easier problem; and since Plato is recommending a method for finding appropriate hypotheses and so reducing hard questions to easier ones, it is analysis that he is recommending.
To see how analysis of the problem "to inscribe in a given circle Y an isosceles triangle equal to a given area X" would lead to Plato's hypothesis, assume the problem solved. So (see Figure 1) let BCG be an isosceles triangle, BC = BG, inscribed in the circle Y and equal to the rectilineal area X. Then let BA be a diameter of the circle Y; the diameter BA perpendicularly bisects the chord CG at a point D. Connect AC. The angle ZACB is inscribed in a semicircle, and is therefore a right angle. So the triangles ADC and CDB are similar, to each other and to the triangle ACB. So, completing the rectangles ADCF and CDBE, we see that these rectangles are similar, and therefore that the rectangle CDBE falls short of the line AB by a figure similar to itself. Since the rectangle CDBE is double the triangle CDB, which is half of the triangle BCG, it follows that CDBE = BCG; but BCG = X, so CDBE = X. So the given area X has been applied to a diameter of the given circle Y in the form of a rectangle, in such a way that it falls short of the diameter by a figure similar to the applied area. As we have seen, the analysis can be reversed, so the hypothesis "the area X can be applied to the diameter of Y in the form of 25 In Prior Analytics 11,25, Aristotle gives this passage (without citing the Meno by name) as an example of reduction [&1Lay l]: we wish to know whether teachable belongs to virtue, it is clear that teachable belongs to knowledge, so we reduce the question whether teachable belongs to virtue to the (hopefully) simpler question whether knowledge belongs to virtue. Aristotle compares this to a geometrical example, Hippocrates of Chios' attempt to reduce the problem of squaring the circle to simpler problems.
a rectangle in such a way that it falls short by a figure similar to the applied area" gives a sufficient as well as a necessary condition for solving the problem "to inscribe in the circle Y an isosceles triangle equal to X." This is not only an easy and straightforward use of analysis, but also a very typical one. In fact, it seems to be part of a systematic program of reducing problems of all kinds to problems of application of areas, in the hope that these problems could all be solved in a simple and uniform way. An important example is theproblem of constructing a regular pentagon, which can be reduced by analysis to the problem "to divide a line in extreme and mean ratio"; this in turn can be reduced by analysis to the problem "to apply a square to its own side in the form of a rectangle in such a way that it exceeds by a square," and this in turn can be reduced by analysis to the problem of finding a mean proportional, and thus solved. Probably beginning from the analysis of the regular pentagon, early Greek geometers developed techniques for solving a broad class of problems of application of areas: Proclus (In Euclidem 419-20) cites Eudemus as attributing these techniques to "the Muse of the Pythagoreans" (i.e. to the tradition from Hippasus to Archytas) and Euclid presents their results in developed form in Elements VI. The original problems would have been "to apply a given area to a given line, in the form of a rectangle, in such a way that it exceeds [or falls short] by a square," but the techniques for solving these problems can be generalized to solve "to apply a given area to a given line, in the form of a rectangle, in such a way that it exceeds [or falls short] by a rectangle similar to a given rectangle" or even "to apply a given area to a given line, in the form of a parallelogram, in such a way that it exceeds [or falls short] by a parallelogram similar to a given parallelogram," which is the problem that Euclid solves in Elements VI,28-29. Euclid gives a 8toptaji6; for the problem of falling-short (which cannot be solved in all cases), and gives a construction which works by reducing both problems to the problem of constructing a parallelogram of a given shape with a given area, which in turn can be reduced to the problem of finding a mean proportional; while Euclid does not explicitly give the analyses of his application-of-areas problems, his exposition makes it obvious that his constructions (and his toptaFgo) were first discovered by analysis.26 The application-of-areas problem that Plato proposes as his 26 In fact the proof of VI,27, giving the S&optajo6 for the falling-short problem VI,28, is a disguised analysis (and thus, in a sense, the earliest extant analysis). What Euclid is doing in these propositions seems to arise from a generalization of the results needed to construct the regular pentagon. Euclid draws from VI,29, the problem of "hypothesis" in the Meno is obviously similar in formulation to Euclid's problems, and comes from the same geometrical research-program; but Plato's problem is more difficult, and Euclid does not discuss it in the Elements because it cannot be reduced to finding a mean proportional or solved by ruler-and-compass constructions. However, there is a solution using conics, which Plato may well have known when he wrote the Meno, and which was certainly within the capacity of Greek geometers at least least by mid-fourth-century.27 But whether Plato knew the solution or not, he would have seen the problem as part of a promising program for finding &toptagoi of any given construction-problem and for solving any problem when it can be solved.28
Thus Plato alludes at Meno 86e4-87b2 to the method of analysis, and more specifically to the program of reducing construction-problems through problematic analysis; and he holds up the program of analysis as a methodological model for philosophical inquiry. But Plato does all this without ever using the word "analysis" (though he must have known the word), and without describing clearly either the logic of the method in general or the geometry of the case he describes: he does not explain either how his application-of-areas problem was derived from the original problem, or how it would help to solve the original problem, or how it might itself be solved; indeed, he does not describe either the original problem or the "hypothesis" clearly enough for anyone who did not already understand the problem Plato is describing to understand him.29 excess, the corollary VI,30, "to divide a line in extreme and mean ratio." Euclid does not use VI,30 to construct the regular pentagon, because he has already done it in IV,10-1 I without using proportion theory, using II, 1, "to divide a straight line so that the rectangle contained by the whole and one segment is equal to the square on the other segment": but this is simply VI,30 reformulated, and re-proved, in such a way as to avoid proportions. Euclid is certainly modifying an earlier order of presentation which used application of areas to construct the pentagon. 27 See the solution of the Meno problem given by Heath, History of Greek Mathematics (Oxford, 1921), v. 1, pp. 300-301, using the same methods that Menaechmus (a student of Eudoxus) used to find two mean proportionals between two given lengths (see Heath, v. 1, pp. 251-5). 28 In the passage of Philodemus' Academica (ed. Gaiser, Stuttgart, 1988, p. 152) reporting some Academic or Peripatetic source on the progress of mathematics in the Academy, and speaking of Plato as research-director, it is said that "analysis and the does not understand what is going on. In fact, the passage is perfect proof for Gaiser's thesis that Plato's dialogues allude to doctrines that they do not fully explain, in an attempt to rouse Plato's readers to seek further enlightenment in the Academy.30 Those of Plato's readers who are familiar with current geometric practice will understand his mathematical allusions; his other readers will pick up that Plato is referring to some geometric result and to some geometric practice which is supposed to be philosophically important and which they would understand if they came to study geometry in the Academy. . Surprisingly, although Socrates had earlier insisted that it was impossible to inquire in this way, he now immediately gives in, and offers to investigate Meno's oiw6v ?vSTt question on the basis of a hypothesis about the xi iart. As we have seen, this hypothetical investigation means using something comparable to the method of analysis to reduce the lo6ov Es;t question to a ti esm question, and to keep reducing it until we reach a question that we can answer directly. In a sense, Socrates has not conceded much on the logical priority of the ti Eart to the loi6ov c'aTl question, since he continues to insist that we cannot know whether virtue is teachable until we can demonstrate the answer from a knowledge of what virtue is. But as a matter of heuristics, Socrates is conceding that it may be useful to begin with the logically posterior nioi6v 9art question, in the hope of discovering an answer both to the Ti irtt and to the noiov E'at questions. Certainly Meno had not been making much progress in his successive attempts to answer the ri iarrt question directly, so perhaps it is worth trying an indirect approach. The geometers are supposed to be able, through analysis, to reason from logically posterior things to logically prior things, and so to discover the appropriate principles for demonstrating an answer to a given question; so perhaps we can imitate their success in philosophy. Thus the first geometrical passage suggests that it is in principle possible come to knowledge of what virtue is, if someone can discover the right series of questions to ask; the second passage suggests that something like an analytic investigation of whether virtue is teachable might be the path that succeeds, in bringing us to knowledge of whether virtue is teachable, and thus also of what virtue is.32 32 If Plato had thought it was worth while, he could also have illustrated the method of analysis in the first geometrical example, by showing how the line of questioning that prompts recollection is an application of the method of analysis. In one sense he is in fact doing this, since part of what prompts recollection is the refutation of the answers that the side of the eight-foot square is four or three; and such a reductio ad What is much less clear is how this is supposed to work. If we start by not knowing the &pXai that we need for demonstrating the answer to our question (here "is virtue teachable?"), how is analysis or its philosophical analogue going to help us find the demonstration? Later Greek philosophers identify analysis with arguing "upward" to the appXai, and suggest that we can first argue "up" from posterior things to the &pxac, then argue back "down" from the apxai to the posterior things. But this kind of argument will not give a demonstration, and so will not give us knowledge of the posterior things, unless we have acquired knowledge of the &pXai: and how is analysis or its analogue supposed to help in that?
There are a number of different senses in which analysis could be said to lead to knowledge of &pXac, and it will help to sort some of these out.
To begin with, apxii can be taken as equivalent to iunt0ec;t, as the proposition which is "laid down" at the beginning of a discourse, to fix the reference of a term or to give a premiss for a deduction.33 In this sense, when absurdum is just an analysis with a negative result. However, the positive result that the side of the eight-foot square is the diagonal of the four-foot square is not shown as being reached analytically: if Socrates had not already known the answer, and asked the boy the right string of questions based on knowledge of this answer, the boy might never have discovered it. But Plato could instead have shown this result as being reached by analysis: suppose a square of area eight square feet has been found; draw the diagonals, dividing the square into four equal isosceles right triangles, each of which is thus of area two square feet. At this stage, probably, something clicks, and we recognize that half of the given two-foot-by-two-foot square, divided by a diagonal, is also an isosceles right triangle of area two square feet. We thus know how to construct purely from givens a figure similar and equal to the figure we have constructed from the lqToi4Levov, namely the isosceles right triangle whose base is the side of the 4toiotrvov square. And we can then reverse the analysis to construct the 41TtOi4LEVOV square of area eight square feet from the isosceles right triangle of area two square feet, by constructing four equal and similar isosceles right triangles around the same vertex. The diagram that would result is the diagram that Socrates in fact draws, and Plato could have represented it as the result of reversing this analysis. But Plato probably thought that the method of analysis was too important to waste on such a trivial example: its power is better brought out by showing how it can contribute to a difficult problem belonging to current or recent mathematical research.
3 Carl Huffman gives a useful collection and discussion of evidence on the early history of the terms apXTi and rno60rat;, especially in Hippocratic texts, in the introduction to his Philolaus of Croton: Pythagorean and Presocratic (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 78-92. The noun bn?6rat; is a relatively late development from the phrase bn7oti-Ora0ct a pXTIv, "to lay down a beginning" for a discourse, where it is often assumed that the appropriate beginning must be something that the listeners will agree to. The sense "beginning of a discourse" connects with the physical sense of &pXPi, since often the appropriate beginning for the discourse will be the "natural" beginning problematic analysis discovers the Stoptc06 for a given problem, it is discovering an apx"i for the proposition, that is, a hypothesis from which the proposition can be proved. But this is not discovering an &p i in such a way that the apXyi is known to be true: and while I think part of what Plato is interested in is simply discovering an appropriate hypothesis for proving a given proposition, he also wants more than that. Thus the Phaedo speaks of going from a hypothesis to a higher hypothesis "until you come to something sufficient" at which you can stop (102el); the Republic says that dialectic proceeds from a hypothesis C'' apXilv avul6OEtov (51Ob6-7), i.e. to an apxii which is not a hypothesis, but which is somehow immediately known (and not merely assumed) to be true. If a hypothesis is something like the Stoptor.o; of a problem, or more generally any condition of a proposition that can be reached by analysis, then what is an apX'9 that is not a hypothesis? A look at the Meno example suggests why the "hypothesis" there is insufficient, and what a more sufficient apxyj might look like. Recall that the problem was posed with regard to a particular area and a particular circle, "whether it is possible to inscribe this area in this circle as a triangle": the geometer says that he can do it "if this area is such that when it is applied to the given line [sc. the diameter of the circle], it falls short by an area similar to the applied area," but he does not know whether this hypothesis holds. This is because the hypothesis is itself a difficult problem (or says that a problem can be solved), and there is no direct way to verify whether it holds of the given area. By contrast, if the hypothesis were "this area is smaller than another given area," there would be a direct way to check whether it holds (assuming both areas are given as rectilineal figures): if it holds, it can be established, not by a general proof, but by a construction that must be verified by direct perception of this particular given area. It seems reasonable to say that when a geometric proposition has been reduced to something that we can verify by direct perception of the given figure, then it has been reduced to an apxi'j that is not a hypothesis. But this depends on visual perception of a figure: this is no help in dialectic, which, unlike geometry, makes no use of visual images, and can lead us to knowledge only by reasoning. How can reasoning lead us to knowledge of an &pXTl that is not a hypothesis? of the thing. The beginning of the discourse may also be something like a definition, not so much as a starting point for deduction as to make sure the speaker and listeners are talking about the same subject (so too in Plato, Phaedrus 237b7-d3). Plato can use &p ' and 'in6eeoa; as equivalent, as with i?n0evoi; at Phaedo 101d7 and &pxj at l0le2.
I don't have a fully adequate answer to this question, and I don't think Plato did either. But further reflection on geometrical analysis will shed some light on how Plato thought its philosophical analogue might work. To begin with, there is an obvious sense in which analysis is reasoning back to an apxil -not simply to a hypothesis (or to the 8toptagi6 of a problem) but to an 'apxi that is known to be true. In (say) the theoretical analysis of a theorem Vx (Px-+Qx), we reason from the Cqro{ievov Qx (together with the "given" Px and the principles of geometry) back to something known to be true, where this could be either an apXiTj of geometry absolutely, or an apxil relatively to this particular proposition, that is, one of the givens of the proposition (Px or -since Px is typically a conjunction -one of the conjuncts in Px), or something that has already been deduced from some combination of these &pXai. In any of these cases it is fair to say that we are reasoning back from the 4qtoiTVevov to an apn that is known to be true.34 But, since the argument begins by assuming a 4MMoi>evov which is not (at the outset) known to be true, the inference from the 4irrovuevov to the apXTi cannot be the cause of our knowing the &pxqi to be true. One possible way out would be to say that we may begin the "upward way" from a Cirro{jievov which we "know" to be true through sense-experience or from authority, but which we do not know scientifically, because we don't understand why it's true. Indeed, in geometry we often start by believing that a theorem is true, on the authority of a teacher or of a book, and then apply theoretical analysis in order to discover a proof, and so to understand why the theorem is true. In such a case, we begin with a 4toV?gVOV which we "know" in a weak sense, reason up to an apXij which we know, and reason back down to the inrrov4ievov, so coming to know it in a stronger sense; Plato would call our initial state "true opinion" rather than knowledge, and he would describe the whole process as converting true opinion into knowledge by "tying it down" through "reasoning out the cause" (Meno 98a3-4) . But again, if we have no means of recognizing the truth of the &pXij independently of the 41toljiEVOV, this process cannot give us scientific knowledge: it will leave us with only true opinion of the &pXij, and so with only true opinion of 34 Plato seems not to be interested in the "logical direction" of analysis, i.e. the fact that starting from the lntoi?rvov Q, we work back to a principle or a given P such Q-+P, in the hope of proving, when we reverse the analysis, that P-+Q. Plato speaks as if we just divined P as a plausible starting point for proving Q, and established that P-+Q; but Plato thinks that we also examine the consequences of the hypothesis -_P, proving (_P)(_Q), and thus indirectly proving Q-+P. the 4iiTouig4vov. This cannot be what Plato means by Socrates' explanation of how we can arrive at knowledge in philosophy. Indeed, if we take the comparison with geometrical analysis seriously, it rules this out, since the success of analysis depends on our inferring to something that we already know to be true, independently of the analytical chain of inferences that lead us to it. But we need to draw a distinction. An analysis terminates when we succeed in inferring something that we already habitually know, but we need not actually know it before we infer it from the 4qto{iEvov. Here I am using Aristotle's terminology of actual and habitual knowledge: I am actually knowing a theorem if I am currently thinking about the theorem and understanding why it is true; I have habitual knowledge of the theorem if I am in such a state that, whenever I turn my attention to the theorem, if nothing obstructs me from thinking about it, I will understand why the theorem is true. Thus someone who has mastered elementary geometry always has habitual knowledge of a large number of theorems, although most of the time he will not have this particular theorem or its proof present to his mind. For an analysis to succeed, we must, when we make the final inference, recognize that its conclusion is something we know to be true: this means that we must already have had habitual knowledge of the conclusion, and so the analytical inference itself cannot be the cause of our habitual knowledge of the conclusion, but it may very well be the cause of our actual knowledge of the conclusion; that is, it may be the occasion that turns our attention to this proposition, actualizes our habitual knowledge of it, and begins the chain of actualizations (as we reverse each step of the analysis) which leads to our having actual knowledge of the theorem we were trying to prove. Indeed, it is in some sense necessary that, when I am in the process of doing an analysis, I do not yet have actual knowledge of the proposition (already habitually known) in which the analysis will terminate. Suppose I am doing a theoretical analysis of the theorem Vx (Px-+Qx). Suppose that, in the analytical chain of inferences beginning from the 'n-ToigeVOv Qx (and also assuming the given Px), the final proposition I reach is Rx; when I reach the conclusion Rx, I recognize that I already have habitual knowledge that Vx (Px-+Rx), and therefore, using the given Px, that Rx. Now suppose that the next-to-last proposition I reach in the analysis, immediately before Rx, is Sx. If the analysis is step-by-step reversible, then, as the first step in reversing the analysis, I will be able to prove Vx (PxnRx-+Sx); since I can also prove Vx (Px-+Rx), I can prove Vx (Px-*Sx). But, clearly, I did not have actual knowledge of the proposition Vx (Px-+Sx) before I drew the analytic inference from Sx to Rx; for, if I had, I would have stopped the analysis at Sx, rather than going on to Rx. So, even if I had actual (and not merely habitual) knowledge of Vx (Px-+Rx), that knowledge must have been somehow "obstructed" and prevented from producing actual knowledge of its consequences. If I had not been thus obstructed somewhere down the line, I would have seen right down the chain of consequences from Px to Qx, and so I would have known the theorem immediately, without having to apply analysis to discover a proof. So analysis, if it succeeds, has the psychological effect of removing an obstruction from some of my habitual knowledge, to allow it to have its full consequences in actual knowledge.
Geometrical analysis can thus provide Plato with a model for philosophical discovery, in one sense of "discovery": it does nothing to explain a transition from not having habitual knowledge to having habitual knowledge, but it helps to explain the transition from having merely habitual knowledge to having actual knowledge, that is, the process of removing an obstruction from our habitual knowledge. But, after all, this is all we can expect from Plato, since he renounces the possibility of explaining the first kind of transition. The point of the account of learning as recollection is just to give up on this, and to say that we have always had habitual knowledge, but that it has been somehow obstructed, and that we "learn" by removing obstructions and reawakening the habitual knowledge that is under the surface of our minds. The two geometrical passages of the Meno serve complementary functions in explaining how we can come to have actual knowledge: the first argues that we have always had habitual knowledge, and the second uses the model of geometrical analysis to explain how we can go from habitual to actual knowledge.
Analysis infers from a inrrovtEvov, assumed but not known to be true, to some kind of apl'j already habitually known to be true; we come to actually know the apx'il, and thus it becomes available as a starting-point for demonstrating the 4nTob'4evov. Analysis is designed to bring some possible &pXii to our attention, and also to bring to our attention a possible series of inferences from this apxil through intermediate propositions to the 4Pqo{iEvov; of course, this can occasion our discovery of an actual proof only if we do have habitual knowledge that the apxl' is true and that each of the inferential steps is justified. If we begin from a true opinion of the CnTo'U14EVOV (based, perhaps, on the authority of a competent teacher), we have good reason to hope that we will reach a true and usable appi, thus stimulating recollection of something we already habitually knew but did not have present to our minds; and, as Plato says, "since all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all things, nothing prevents someone, once he has recollected just one thing -and this is what people call learning -from finding out all the others" (Meno 81c9-d3) . Nonetheless, there is an important disanalogy between geometrical analysis and the kind of philosophical inquiry that Plato wants it to illustrate. In geometry, we are interested in awakening actual knowledge of the apXlj only as a means to discovering a proof of the 4Ptov'4evov; the &p j (in the example I have been using, Rx, or Vx (Px-+Rx)) is not in itself something especially desirable to know -it is, generally, an obvious fact but one that had not occurred to us in this connection, or had not seemed useful as a starting point for proving the 4PTou{jvov. As Plato sees it, the philosophical case is different: although a particular inquirer (such as Meno) may be more interested in the posterior question (whether virtue is teachable) than in the prior question (what virtue is), so that in a particular dialectical situation we may be led to ask about the apxyil for the sake of knowing the ,notUoevov, nonetheless Plato thinks that the knowledge of the apxil (of what virtue is, and ultimately, of the good) is intrinsically much more desirable than all the knowledge we can derive from it. The knowledge of the &pXnj is a great good, but it is one we already have, deep within us; but like the food and drink of Tantalus (apparently recalled at Euthydemus 280b-d), it is a possession that we are prevented from using, and so does not actually benefit us. Since this knowledge lies deeply buried within us, to uncover it and make it available would be a great good; whereas the principles of geometry lie pretty close to the surface, and the great thing is not to dig them up but to build something with them. Despite this difference between the aims of geometry and of Platonic philosophy, Plato finds the method of analysis an encouraging model for what he hopes can happen in philosophical discovery. In the Seventh Letter he says that the knowledge he aims at "suddenly, like a light kindled from a leaping fire, comes to be in the soul and then nourishes itself' (341c7-d2); but in this same passage he is warning against false claims of insight, and insisting that the leaping and kindling come about only "with the maximum of practice and much time" (344b2-3),35 35 There is an untranslatable pun in ptpIi: "practice" in the sense of repeated exercise as opposed to theoretical instruction (perhaps as a way of leaming to apply the instruction, but Gorgias 463b2-4 describes rhetoric and relish-making as "not TExVn but tigrnpia ca'i tp4o "); also just "spending time" (like taurp43sn, the standard word for philosophical education through conversation and companionship); but also "rubbing," a sense which Plato makes good use of here, with a suggestion of starting a fire by friction. through patient and rigorous inquiry. What Plato is describing is an everyday experience in geometry. When analysis succeeds, something suddenly happens, a spark jumps, we suddenly understand something or see something in a new light, and see how to find what we were looking for; but analysis is also a precise discipline that we can become trained in, and that must be practiced rigorously and patiently for the result to come about; and it is accompanied by a rigorous method of synthesis for checking and for discarding false inspirations. One can only wish there was something like that in philosophy.36 
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